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Location, Proximity, and M&A Transactions 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine how the geographic location of firms affects acquisition decisions and 
value creation for acquirers in takeover transactions. We find that firms located in an urban area 
are more likely to receive a takeover bid and complete a takeover transaction as a target 
compared with firms located in rural areas, and takeover deals involving an urban target are 
associated with higher acquirer announcement returns, after controlling for the proximity 
between the target and the acquirer. In addition, a target’s urban location significantly attenuates 
the negative effect of a long distance between the target and the acquirer on acquirer returns, a 
fact that is documented in the existing literature. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored 
force—firm location—that can affect takeover transactions, in addition to proximity. Our paper 
suggests that a firm’s location plays an important role in facilitating the dissemination of soft 
information and enhancing information-based synergies. 
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1. Introduction  
Takeover transactions represent a large and increasingly important economic activity, 
especially in recent years. According to Thomson Reuters, the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
announced in 2013 amount to a total transaction volume of $2.4 trillion.1 The large number of 
transactions in the takeover market has been puzzling given that M&As do not always create 
value for bidders (see, e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Betton, Eckbo, and 
Thorburn, 2008).  
Why then do takeovers happen? The existing theoretical literature has proposed a range 
of agency, industrial organizational, and behavioral arguments that explain firms’ incentives to 
pursue takeover activities. These explanations include market power, empire building, market 
timing, operating efficiency enhancement, asset complementarity, acquisition of growth option, 
and hubris (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Roll, 1986; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; Levine, 2012).2  
Given the prevalence of takeover transactions, an equally important question is which 
firms are more likely to become takeover targets and to get acquired. A number of studies 
explore various firm characteristics, including size, profitability, market valuation, insider 
ownership, institutional holdings, and banking relationships, that could influence a firm’s 
probability of becoming a takeover target (e.g., Stevens, 1973; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; 
Palepu, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1989; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Ivashina et al., 
2009; Bayar and Chemmanur, 2012). In this paper, we focus on a previously untested firm 
characteristic—a firm’s geographic location—to explore how a firm’s urban (as opposed to 
rural) location affects its probability of becoming a takeover target and completing a takeover 
transaction. We further examine upon a takeover occurring, how the urban location of a target 
firm affects the acquirer’s shareholder wealth. 
A firm’s geographic location plays an important role in M&As because acquisition deals 
involve a large amount of soft-information production and transmission (Coff, 1999). Better 
communication of soft information can help the acquirer and the target to mutually discover 
information-based synergies (e.g., collaborative research and development ventures) and hence 
                                                 
1 See, for example, http://www.pwc.es/es/servicios/transacciones/assets/thomson-reuters-mergers-and-acquisitions-
review-2013.pdf. 
2 A large number of empirical papers provide evidence testing the predictions of various theoretical models. For a 
comprehensive survey of this literature, see Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) and Eckbo (2014).  
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create higher values for both parties (Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan, 2008; Kang and Kim, 
2008). However, unlike hard information that is largely tangible and easy to verify and 
communicate, soft information is difficult to codify and transmit (Petersen, 2004). The 
communication of soft information, such as evaluations of knowledge-based assets and 
managerial skills, demands an acquirer’s intensive interpersonal interactions with the target in 
social, civic, and business occasions (Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan, 2008). This feature of 
soft information, in turn, makes the acquirer location and the target location important as they 
determine the accessibility between the two parties in an M&A transaction. 
While the existing literature has examined the effect of geographical distance between an 
acquirer and a target on acquirer returns (e.g., Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan, 2008), we focus 
on the target’s and the acquirer’s urban versus rural location. This focus is motivated by the 
notion that although proximity can affect the accessibility between the two parties, it is not the 
only determinant. A firm’s physical location (i.e., urban or rural areas), which determinates the 
easiness of transportation, can play an additional role in enhancing or hindering accessibility. We 
illustrate this intuition using the following example. Consider an acquirer located in Dallas, 
Texas, and two potential targets located in New York City (urban) and Topeka, Kansas (rural), 
respectively. Even though New York City is significantly farther away from Dallas (i.e., 1,548 
miles) than from Topeka (i.e., 487 miles), New York’s urban location makes it much easier to 
travel for the Dallas acquirer.3 This easy access, in turn, facilitates the transmission of soft 
information and can generate a higher value for the Dallas acquirer, making the New York firm a 
more attractive target in despite of its longer distance. Hence, the role of the target’s urban 
location can function on top of the effect of proximity to affect the acquiring firm’s acquisition 
decisions and value creation.  
In line with this intuition, we show that firms located in an urban area are more likely to 
receive a takeover bid and complete a takeover transaction as a target, and takeover deals 
involving an urban target create larger values for the acquirer (i.e., higher acquirer announcement 
returns), after controlling for the proximity between the target and the acquirer. More 
importantly, an urban location of the target firm significantly attenuates the negative effect of a 
                                                 
3 Indeed, a typical aircraft flight from Dallas to Topeka requires at least one connection and lasts up to eight hours. 
On the other hand, a nonstop flight from Dallas to New York City takes approximately 3.5 hours. 
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long distance between the target and the acquirer on value creation for the acquirer, a fact that is 
documented in the existing studies (see, e.g., Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan, 2008).  
In the above example, we further consider two scenarios: (1) the Dallas acquirer is 
located in the metropolitan area with easy access to Dallas’s major airline hubs, and (2) the 
Dallas acquirer is located in a Dallas suburb, which is a one-hour drive from the major airline 
hubs. It is intuitive that the advantage of the New York target’s urban location (in bringing easier 
access between the two parties) is more valuable in the second scenario than in the first, in which 
case the acquirer may already have easy access to the target to begin with. Consistent with this 
intuition, we find that the positive effect of the target’s urban location is indeed more pronounced 
when the acquirer’s location does not permit easy transportation to the target. 
Taken together, these findings suggest a significant role of both the target and the 
acquirer locations in a takeover transaction, and this role functions on top of the effect of 
proximity. The economic magnitudes of these effects are also sizable. For example, a firm 
located in an urban area is 41.2% more likely to receive a takeover bid compared to a nonurban 
firm, and the acquirer’s five-day announcement abnormal returns with an urban target are 27 
basis points higher than those with a nonurban target. In addition, while a one-standard-deviation 
increase (810 miles) in the proximity of the two parties lowers the acquirer announcement 
returns by 130 basis points, the target’s urban location attenuates this negative effect by 93%. 
This attenuation effect is even more pronounced when the acquirer does not already have 
convenient access to the target.  
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, our paper contributes to the 
burgeoning literature on the role of geographic proximity and firm location in corporate finance. 
This research has shown that geographic distance matters in various financial phenomena, such 
as bank lending (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger et al., 2005), venture capital investment 
(Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009; Tian, 2011), capital structure and cash policy (Loughran, 2008; 
Almazan et al., 2010), payout policy (John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva, 2011), analyst coverage 
(Malloy, 2005; Bae, Stulz, and Tan, 2008), patenting (Jia and Tian, 2015), feedback along the 
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supply chain (Chu et al., 2014), board information gathering (Alam et al., 2014), and board 
monitoring and advising services (Bennett, 2013).4  
In the context of M&As, Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan (2008) find that acquirer 
returns in local transactions are more than twice as high as those in nonlocal transactions. Kang 
and Kim (2008) show that block acquirers have a strong preference for local targets, and local 
block acquirers create synergies as they are more likely to engage in post-acquisition governance 
improvement. In addition to examining the role of geographic proximity between acquirers and 
targets, our paper reveals that a previously underexplored force—firm location, either urban or 
rural—can impact takeover transactions.  
Second, our work adds to the recent literature that explores the determinants of a firm’s 
likelihood of being taken over. For example, Ivashina et al. (2009) investigate the effects of bank 
lending relationship on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a takeover target. 
Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) introduce the role of the stake of bidder’s advisory 
investment bank into this literature. Bayar and Chemmanur (2012) focus on private firms and 
find that certain firm and industry characteristics (e.g., industry competitiveness, opaqueness, 
private benefits of control, and venture capital backing) are related to a private firm’s acquisition 
likelihood. Our paper extends this stream of literature by showing that a firm’s geographic 
location is another important dimension of takeover determinants. 
Our findings suggest that the effect of proximity on acquisition decisions and value 
creation shown in previous studies might not be monotonic. This effect could change 
interactively with the firm’s urban location or access to transportation. This implication could be 
extended to areas other than the setting of M&As (e.g., capital structure, payout policy, analyst 
coverage, venture capital investment, and bank lending). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample selection and 
summary statistics. Section 3 analyzes how the location of firms affects their likelihood of 
becoming an attempted and completed takeover target. Section 4 examines how the location of 
firms impacts value creation for acquirers, as well as for targets. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Our paper is also broadly related to the literature that studies the role of board busyness, experience, monitoring, 
and advising based on both soft and hard information production (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; 2012; 
Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011, 2013; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field, Lowry, and Mrktchyan, 2013). 
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2. Data and Sample Description 
Our sample comes from several different data sources. We obtain the initial sample of 
firm-year observations between 1990 and 2009, from the Compustat Industrial Annual Files. We 
exclude firms in financial and regulated utility industries (SIC 6000–6999 and SIC 4900–4999), 
as well as firms located outside of the United States. We then collect firm stock return data from 
CRSP, financial statement information from Compustat, analyst coverage data from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate Systems (I/B/E/S), institutional ownership and blockholder data 
from the Thomson Financial 13F institutional holdings database, and corporate governance 
proxy variables from the RiskMetrics database. Next, we obtain information on mergers and 
acquisitions from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. Throughout the paper, we refer 
to these transactions as either takeover transactions or M&A transactions and use the words 
“takeovers” and “M&As” interchangeably. 
Following the previous literature, we use a firm’s headquarters as a proxy for its 
geographic location.5 We collect firm headquarters location data from Compustat. We use the 
ZIP code information from firm headquarters to identify the firm’s corresponding latitude and 
longitude, using the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Files. We then generate the following 
three location measures for our following analyses. First, for our analyses on whether urban 
firms have a high takeover exposure (i.e., whether they are more likely to receive a takeover bid 
or complete a takeover transaction), we generate an urban location dummy, Top10MSA urban, 
for each firm-year observation. This variable equals one if a firm is located in one of the top ten 
largest metropolitan areas of the United States identified as of the 2000 Census, and zero 
otherwise.6 Second, in a sample of all announced takeover transactions, we calculate the physical 
distance between the target and the acquirer based on the two parties’ latitude and longitude 
coordinates. (We discuss the detailed algorithm in Appendix A.) This distance measure allows us 
to examine the interaction between the target’s urban location and its distance from the acquirer. 
Third, for each announced takeover transaction, we follow John, Knyazeva, and Knyzaeva 
and calculate the distance between the acquirer and the nearest major airport hub in the United 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), and Malloy (2005). 
6 The ten largest metropolitan areas include New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, San 
Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston. 
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States as a measure of the acquirer’s easiness of transportation.7 This measure enables us to 
analyze the effect of the acquirer’s location on value creation in a takeover transaction, in 
addition to the target’s location and the proximity between the two parties. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for firms’ location measures and various firm 
characteristics. This table consists of the full sample of 18,606 firm-year observations, which we 
use in our analysis on firms’ takeover exposures. Among these observations, 9,943 are urban 
firms and the remaining 8,663 observations are nonurban firms. The first two rows show that in 
the full sample, 5.1% of firm-years receive at least one takeover bid and 4.4% of firm-years 
observe a completed takeover transaction during our sample period. After breaking down these 
numbers based on firms’ headquarters location, we observe that 5.8% of urban firm-years 
receive at least one takeover bid and 5.1% of urban firm-years become completed takeover 
targets. These propensities are significantly higher compared with 4.3% (attempted takeovers) 
and 3.6% (completed takeovers) for nonurban firms. The differences in these univariate 
comparisons are both significant at the 1% level, suggesting that urban firms are subject to 
higher takeover exposures than are nonurban firms.  
The rest of Table 1 compares firm characteristics between urban and nonurban firms. 
Consistent with the findings of Loughran (2008), urban firms are on average larger than 
nonurban firms. The average total assets of urban firms are approximately $4 billion, while those 
of nonurban firms are $2.8 billion. Urban firms also have a larger cash reserve, higher growth 
opportunities (measured by Tobin’s q), fewer tangible assets, lower leverage, and are more 
profitable than nonurban firms. Urban firms are covered by a larger number of financial analysts 
than are nonurban firms, consistent with Loughran and Schulz (2005). In addition, they have a 
larger number of potential local acquirers, but also face a greater competition as there are a larger 
number of potential local targets. The geographic distance between potential local acquirers and 
the target firm is significantly smaller for urban firms. Lastly, urban firms have fewer 
antitakeover provisions in corporate charters. In particular, they are less likely to have a poison 
pill and a classified board in place. We discuss variable constructions in more detail in Appendix 
B. 
                                                 
7 Major airport hubs are the ones that account for over 0.25% of totally U.S. passenger enplanements, as classified 
by the Federal Aviation Administration. 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for 11,584 announced takeover transactions at the 
deal level that are used in our analysis on value creation for acquirers (i.e., acquirer 
announcement returns). For these announced deals, we are able to observe acquirer-target-pair-
specific location measures (e.g., the distance between the acquirer and the target, and the 
acquirer’s location) and deal-specific characteristics (e.g., the acquirer’s and the target’s 
announcement returns). Among all the announced transactions, 50.4% deals involve a target that 
is located in an urban area, and 49.6% of deals involve a nonurban target. The average distance 
between the acquirer and the target is 806 miles. The average distance between an acquirer and 
the nearest airport hub (Acquirer-to-hub distance) is 30 miles.  
Table 2 also displays deal-specific characteristics. An average acquirer in our sample has 
a market value of $6 billion, a market-to-book ratio of 2.3, and an ROA of 9.7% prior to the deal 
announcement. The M&A transactions in our sample have an average deal value of $419 million. 
Seventy percent of these transactions involve nonpublic (private or a subsidiary of a public 
entity) targets. In terms of payment methods, 27% of transactions are financed by cash, and 26% 
are all-equity acquisitions. In addition, 38% of the deals are diversifying acquisitions (in which 
the acquirer and the target do not share the same two-digit SIC code). When we compare deals 
with urban targets and those with nonurban targets, we notice a few differences in the 
characteristics between the two groups. For example, acquirers of an urban target have a larger 
market value, a higher Tobin’s q, and a lower leverage. Deals involving an urban target are 
larger and more likely to use cash as opposed to stock as a method of payment. They are also 
more likely to be diversifying acquisitions, to combine high-tech firms, and to be tender offers. 
We control for these deal characteristics in our later multivariate analyses. 
 
3. Firm Location and Takeover Exposures 
 The geographic location of firms plays an important role in an acquirer’s takeover 
decision. Takeover transactions typically involve a large amount of soft-information production 
and transmission (Coff, 1999). Better communication of soft information typically leads to 
higher value creation because it helps the acquirer and target to discover information-based 
synergies, such as the discovery of promising collaborative research and development ventures 
(Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan, 2008), and the collaboration of scientists in the two parties 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993). An urban location makes a firm more accessible, 
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thereby facilitating the communication of soft information. To this extent, we expect that an 
urban firm will emerge as a more attractive target than a similar nonurban firm. Hence, an urban 
firm is more likely to receive a takeover bid or complete a takeover transaction.  
 In this section, we test this hypothesis by examining how the geographic location of firms 
affects acquirers’ acquisition decisions. We first provide baseline analysis in the full firm-year 
sample. We then employ an instrumental variable approach, propensity score matching, and a 
nonmoving subsample to alleviate potential endogeneity concerns in the baseline findings. We 
further supplement our analyses with a few robustness checks.  
 
3.1. Baseline analyses  
In Figure 1, we present a graphical analysis to compare takeover exposures between 
urban (solid line) and nonurban firms (dotted line). Panels A and B plot the time-series trends of 
attempted and completed takeovers (in which the firm is actually acquired) from 1990 to 2009, 
respectively. In all years, except for 2001 and 2005, the solid lines in both panels stay above the 
dotted lines. These observations suggest that urban firms tend to receive more attempted 
takeover bids than do nonurban firms, and these bids are more likely to land as completed deals. 
They provide preliminary evidence that firms located in urban areas have a higher takeover 
exposure.  
To formalize this graphical analysis, we estimate the following probit model: 
Pr(receiving a takeover bid/completing a deal)i,t  
= Ф (α + β*Top10MSA urbani,t + γ’Controlsi,t-1 + εi,t),           (1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes time. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one 
if firm i receives a takeover bid (or if the transaction is complete) in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Ф(.) represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. The 
variable of interest is the Top10MSA urban dummy that captures whether a firm is located in an 
urban or a nonurban area.  
We incorporate a comprehensive set of controls that can predict a firm’s takeover 
exposure. First, we follow Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) and control for firm size, Tobin’s q, 
ROA, leverage, cash availability, sales growth, asset tangibility, and analyst coverage. Second, 
we account for the industry merger intensity and include an indicator variable for whether there 
is a takeover attempt in the same two-digit SIC industry in the year prior to the acquisition. 
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we control for the effect of firms’ financial distress with a dummy variable indicating whether a 
firm has high default probabilities (i.e., Altman (1968) z-scores below 1.81). Fourth, because 
takeovers are more likely to occur as shareholder control increases (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
1986, Ambrose and Megginson 1992), we include Blockholder to capture the existence of a 
block shareholder, defined as an institutional shareholder who owns more than 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares. Fifth, because urban firms tend to adopt fewer antitakeover provisions 
(which mechanically expose them to a higher takeover likelihood than nonurban firms) we 
control for a firm’s takeover protections in the regressions. We focus on whether a firm has a 
poison pill and a classified board in place, because these two characteristics are the most 
effective takeover deterrent mechanisms against a takeover attempt.8  
Lastly, we take into account the possibility that our location measure, Top10MSA urban, 
might simply capture a cluster of potential local acquirers and hence more takeover opportunities 
in urban areas. For a given firm, we define all firms that are in the same metropolitan area and 
have larger total assets than this focal firm as its potential local acquirers. We then include the 
number of potential local bidders as a control variable.9 In addition, the local pool of potential 
targets could also affect a certain firm’s takeover likelihood: urban firms that face more 
competition are less likely to become a takeover target in this area. Hence, for a given firm, we 
define all firms that are in the same two-digit SIC industry and in the same metropolitan area 
with total assets within a [50%, 150%] bandwidth of this focal firm as its potential local targets. 
We then include the number of potential local targets as a control.10 Furthermore, to ensure that 
our Top10MSA urban dummy does not merely capture proximity, which is the focus of the 
existing literature, we control for geographic distance between acquirers and targets. For firm-
year observations that have received takeover bids, this measure is straightforward to calculate. 
For the rest of firm-year observations with no acquisition activities, we calculate the average 
distance between potential local acquirers and the focal firm.11 
                                                 
8 We also use alternative proxies for antitakeover protections, such as poison pill alone, classified board alone, the 
E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), or the G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). We find similar 
results. 
9 Our results are robust to using alternative total assets cutoffs, such as 150% or 200%, or to using the same two-
digit SIC industry potential local bidders.  
10 Our results are robust if we use an alternative [80%, 120%] or [70%, 130%] bandwidth.  
11 We have also used an alternative proxy for proximity by examining the total number of firms in the same MSA, 
and the results are robust. Because this alternative measure is highly correlated with the distance measure, we only 
include one variable in the regression.  
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In all regressions, we include both year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects to control 
for time trends and industry patterns of takeover exposures. We cluster standard errors at the firm 
level as suggested by Petersen (2009). For easier interpretation of a probit model, we report 
marginal effects of all independent variables.  
Table 3 presents the regression results. We report results based on both attempted and 
completed takeovers. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable equals one if the firm 
receives at least one takeover bid in a given year, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable equals one if the transaction is completed in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
In all specifications, we find evidence that an urban location is positively related to firms’ 
takeover exposures, as indicated by the significant positive coefficients of Top10MSA urban. The 
economic magnitude is sizable. For example, based on column (2), being located in an urban 
region increases a firm’s likelihood of becoming a takeover target by 2.1 percentage points in a 
given year. In comparison, the average unconditional probability of a firm receiving a takeover 
bid in our sample is 5.1 percentage points (Table 1). As such, an urban location increases a 
firm’s takeover exposure by 41.2% (= 2.1/5.1). We find a similar interpretation when examining 
completed takeover transactions in columns (3) and (4). 
Other control variables have the expected signs as suggested in the existing literature. For 
example, larger firms and firms with a higher q have lower exposures to takeovers, whereas 
firms followed by more financial analysts are more likely to receive a takeover bid. In line with 
Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) and Ivashina et al. (2009), Blockholder dummy has a positive 
coefficient, confirming the active role of external blockholders in takeover activities. 
Interestingly, a firm’s takeover likelihood decreases as the number of potential local targets 
increases. However, the number of potential local bidders and the distance between potential 
acquirers and the focal firm do not play a significant role. In addition, firms’ antitakeover 
protections do not appear to have a significant effect on their takeover exposures.  
 
3.2. Addressing endogeneity concerns 
Next, we address a number of potential endogeneity concerns that may bias the 
estimations in our baseline analyses. First, there might be omitted variable that affects both a 
firm’s location and its takeover exposure. That is, firms may co-locate because of certain 
common geographic advantages (e.g., proximity to research resources) that can lower the cost of 
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horizontal or vertical takeovers and make M&As more likely to happen. Second, our baseline 
results might be driven by reverse causality. That is, firms that intend to increase their takeover 
exposures relocate to urban areas to explore this opportunity. In both cases, our key variable of 
interest, Top10MSA urban, is endogenous. We employ three approaches to address these 
concerns. 
 
3.2.1. Instrumental variable analyses  
 We start by using an instrumental variable approach to establish a causal link between a 
firm’s urban location and its takeover exposure. We construct two alternative instrumental 
variables for Top10MSA urban and undertake two separate instrumental variable analyses.  
 Our first instrument for Top10MSA urban is the proportion of firms in each firm’s same 
industry that are located in the urban areas (where industries are defined using two-digit SIC). 
The intuition is that, if a high proportion of a firm’s industry peers are located in urban areas, 
then this firm, which presumably has the same location preference (due to a similar clientele 
distribution or marketing strategy), is also likely to be located in an urban area. Hence, this 
instrument satisfies the relevance condition of a valid instrument. This intuition is consistent with 
Almazan et al. (2010) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008). However, the industry-level 
location is unlikely to be directly correlated with the takeover exposure of this particular firm, 
which ensures that the instrumental variable reasonably satisfies the exclusion restriction. We 
report the regression results using this instrument in Table 4 panel A.   
 In the first stage, we regress Top10MSA urban on Industry urban (i.e., the instrument), as 
well as on all control variables used in the second stage. In column (1), the first-stage regression 
shows that our instrument is significantly correlated with Top10MSA urban. The coefficient 
estimate of the instrument is positive and significant at the 1% level. It suggests that a firm’s 
industry-level concentration in urban areas significantly predicts the firm’s location in urban 
areas. The F-statistic of the first-stage regression is 13.34 and significant at the 1% level. Based 
on the rule-of-thumb diagnostics suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), we reject the null 
hypothesis that our instrument is a weak instrument. Therefore, the coefficient estimates in the 
second stage are likely unbiased and the inferences based on them are reasonably valid.  
In the second stage (columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 panel A), we replace the key 
independent variable with the instrumented Top10MSA urban. Its coefficient estimates are 
12 
 
positive and significant at the 1% level for both attempted and completed takeovers, with sizable 
economic magnitudes. This evidence suggests that, after controlling for potential endogeneity in 
a firm’s physical location, all our main results hold.  
Since the success of an instrumental variable analysis hinges on the satisfaction of the 
exclusion restriction, which is inherently untestable and has to be conceptually motivated, we 
construct an alternative instrument for Top10MSA urban to check the robustness of our results. 
The alternative instrument pertains to the birthplace of a firm’s founder. It is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the founder of a firm was born in an urban area and zero otherwise. 
This instrument follows the intuition that entrepreneurs tend to start businesses in regions in 
which they have deep roots (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson, 2007; Parwada, 2008; Borowiecki, 2013). 
These regions provide entrepreneurs with abundant social capital (Stouffer, 1940; Zipf, 1949), 
which is crucial for the survival and success of their ventures (see Hoang and Antonicic (2003) 
for a review of the large literature on this argument). Given the founder’s “home preference,” we 
expect (and verify) that the urban status of a firm founder’s birthplace is highly correlated with 
the urban status of the firm’s location as the entrepreneur is likely to build the firm near his 
birthplace.12 This argument ensures that the instrument variable satisfies the relevance condition.  
Regarding the exclusion restriction, firm founders cannot control their birth location, and 
parental choice is also unlikely to be correlated with factors that would affect the takeover 
exposure of the firm founded many years later by the child they give birth to. Hence, this 
instrument is likely to satisfy the exclusion condition.  
Following this intuition, we hand-collect founder information, including founder 
identities and birthplaces. Specifically, we first search each of our sample firms’ founder 
information from sources including the Marquis Who’s Who database, Wikipedia, and online 
searches. We then rely on these sources to collect birthplaces information for the identified 
founders. This step requires the availability of birthplace information at the city or county level, 
so that we can classify whether or not a founder’s birthplace is an urban area (see the procedure 
described in Section 2). We end up with a sample of 772 firms (approximately 34% of our total 
                                                 
12 Indeed, approximately 32% of our sample firms have headquarters located within 60 miles of their founders’ 
birthplaces (as identified by the ZIP codes). This ratio is consistent with Yonker (2014), who documents that about 
30% of the sample firms’ CEOs are matched to firms headquartered in the CEO’s origin state, supporting the 
argument that CEOs have a “home preference” for career decisions. 
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sample firms), for which we are able to collect detailed information on founders’ birthplaces. 
This is the subsample we employ for analyses using founders’ birthplaces as the instrument. 
We report the results in Table 4 panel B. In the first stage, we regress Top10MSA urban 
on Founder birthplace urban (i.e., the instrument) as well as all control variables used in the 
second stage. In column (1), the coefficient estimate of the instrument is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. The F-statistic is 244 and significant at the 1% level. Based on the rule-of-thumb 
diagnostics, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is a weak instrument.  
In the second stage, reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 panel B, we replace the 
key independent variable with the instrumented Top10MSA urban. Its coefficient estimates are 
positive and significant at the 1% level for both attempted and completed takeovers. Overall, our 
instrumental variable approach suggests a positive and causal effect of a firm’s urban location on 
its takeover exposure.  
 
3.2.2. Propensity matching 
 Next, we reinforce the instrumental variable approach by performing a propensity score 
matching analysis. Specifically, we match firms located in urban areas in our sample (the 
treatment group) to those located in nonurban areas based on various observable dimensions that 
could affect firms’ location. This approach enables us to put together a set of similar firms, 
except for their urban location, as a control group. If the differences in takeover exposures 
between the two groups are mainly driven by these observable dimensions, then we should not 
see such differences between the treated and the matched control groups. Otherwise, our 
previous findings should continue to hold. 
  We match the urban firms in our sample based on a comprehensive set of firm 
characteristics as listed in panel A of Table 5. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), we 
match firms based on the nearest-neighbor propensity score. Specifically, we first run a logistic 
model among all the urban and nonurban firm-year observations by regressing Top10MSA urban 
on various firm characteristics. This regression generates a propensity score, that is, the predicted 
probability of being located in an urban area for each firm-year. Next, for each urban firm-year, 
we select 1, 3, and 5 firm-year observations from the nonurban firm-year sample that have the 
closest propensity scores (i.e., the 1, 3, and 5 nearest neighbors). These matched firms-years 
constitute the control group for our sample of urban firms.  
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 Panels A and B of Table 5 provide three sets of diagnostic tests to compare the extent of 
balancing between the treatment and matched control samples. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985), panel A reports the t-statistics testing the difference in the means of each firm 
characteristic between the two samples before and after the matching. After the matching, none 
of the differences across these two groups are statistically significant like before. This 
observation suggests that our matching process has removed meaningful observable differences 
between the two groups of firms.  
 Second, we calculate the standardized percentage bias between the two groups before and 
after the matching, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). This measure is defined as the 
difference in the sample means of each variable in the two groups, as a percentage of the square 
root of the average of sample variances for this variable. Intuitively, this measure captures the 
magnitude of a variable’s deviation between the two groups. Hence, a well-performed propensity 
score matching should reduce this bias to a fairly low level. The first two columns of panel B 
report the mean and median of the standardized percentage biases for all the characteristics in 
panel A. It shows that before the matching, the two groups observe an average (median) 
deviation of 14.8% (14.2%), meaning that there is a 14.8% (14.2%) discrepancy among all the 
firm characteristics between the two groups. This deviation is greatly reduced to 1% (0.7%) after 
the matching, suggesting that the matched control group now becomes more balanced to the 
treatment group.  
Third, because the propensity score matching algorithm matches firm characteristics 
jointly, rather than individually, it is necessary to further examine the overall balancing of these 
variables. Therefore, we follow Sianesi (2004) and evaluate the joint significance/insignificance 
of the firm characteristics. Specifically, we generate several statistics based on our first-stage 
propensity score regression (i.e., a probit model that regresses a Treatment indicator on all the 
characteristics in panel A). These statistics include the pseudo R-squared, likelihood ratio, and 
the p-values testing the joint insignificance of the regressors. Intuitively, a well-performed 
matching should sufficiently lower the likelihood ratio and the pseudo R-squared. In addition, 
after the matching, we should be unable to reject the null hypothesis that all the matching 
variables are jointly insignificant in determining the Treatment indicator (i.e., the p-value of the 
F-test should be greater than 10%). This is indeed what we observe in columns (3) to (5) of panel 
B. 
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 After validating our propensity score matching procedure, we present the differences of 
takeover exposure between our urban firms (the treatment group) and the matched nonurban 
firms (the control group) in panel C. Our main findings continue to hold for both attempted and 
completed takeovers, with sizable economic magnitudes. Based on the nearst-1 neighborhood 
matching, a firm’s urban location increases its takeover exposure by 18% in a given year. We 
find similar interpretations for the nearest-3 and nearest-5 neighborhood matching, as well as for 
completed takeover deals. 
 
3.2.3. Nonmoving subsample analyses 
 Next, we employ a test to further address the reverse causality concern: firms that intend 
to increase their takeover exposures may endogenously relocate to urban areas to explore this 
opportunity. We limit our attention to a subsample of firms whose location was determined well 
before they are exposed to a takeover opportunity and have never moved since then. In this 
subsample, a firm’s location is pre-determined and is unlikely to be affected by the takeover 
opportunities far into the future.  
 We identify whether a firm’s headquarters have moved using data on the historical 
headquarters location of firms from the Compact Disclosure database.13 We consider a firm as a 
moving firm if the city name of its headquarters changes from one year to another. We choose to 
identify moving firms based on the change of their city names because changes in street 
numbers/names or ZIP codes may overestimate the number of meaningful moving firms, 
whereas a change in state name may omit situations in which firms move within a state.14 We 
then repeat our analyses in this sample, using both the baseline and instrumental variable 
regressions.  
 Table 6 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) present the baseline regressions 
estimating equation (1). Columns (3) and (4) present the instrumental variable regressions using 
Industry urban as the instrument, and Columns (5) and (6) present the instrumental variable 
regressions using Founder birthplace urban as the instrument. To save space, we suppress the 
                                                 
13 Unlike Compustat, Compact Disclosure publishes data, from historical SEC filings, on the street address, city, 
state, and area ZIP code for firm headquarters. 
14 We are able to identify 1,785 moving firms in our sample. Because our data from Compact Disclosure starts from 
1990 and ends at 2004, we leave a five-year window out of our sample and only focus on the period from 1995–
2004, to ensure that there are at least five years separating a firm’s location decision and its future takeover 
exposure. This restriction ensures the predetermination of the firm’s location, independent of its future takeover 
exposure. 
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coefficient estimates of other control variables. We continue to observe positive and significant 
coefficient estimates of the Top10MSA urban dummy. This finding again suggests that our 
baseline results are unlikely driven by firms’ endogenous choices of location. 
 
3.2.4. Additional robustness analyses 
 We undertake several additional tests to check the robustness of our baseline findings. 
First, we split our sample into two subperiods: 1991–2001 and 2002–2010. We do so to examine 
whether our results still hold in the most recent decade when the information technology and 
communication tools developed quickly. While these developments largely facilitate the 
transmission of hard information, their impact on the communication of soft information is 
limited because, as discussed before, the collection and communication of soft information rely 
on intensive interpersonal interactions. If the advantage of a firm’s urban location lies in the 
improved dissemination of soft information, then we should expect our results to hold in this 
latter period. This is indeed what we observe in Table 7 panel A.  
Second, we exclude from our sample takeovers in the Bay area, New York, and Boston. 
We do this test because firms in the same industry are particularly likely to endogenously co-
locate to these locations to take advantage of certain geographic advantages (e.g., proximity to 
research resources) and at the same time see more horizontal or vertical takeovers. Table 7 panel 
B shows that our main findings remain statistically significant after excluding these locations, 
with a sizable economic significance. 
Third, we conduct a set of tests to examine whether the target’s urban location affects the 
completion of a deal after the deal is announced. These tests are in a similar vein as our baseline 
regressions but are conditional on the set of announced M&A deals. Therefore, we are able to 
observe the actual distance between the acquirer and the target in an announced deal and gauge 
its effect on the likelihood of deal completions. In our sample, about 89% of announced deals are 
eventually completed. In an untabulated analysis, using both a probit and a rare-event logit 
model, we find that the target urban dummy appears to be positively associated with a deal’s 
completion, as expected. However, the relation is not statistically significant. This result seems 
to suggest that the advantage of the target’s urban location tends to play a more important role 
when acquirers are identifying candidate targets. It exhibits a limited role in determining a deal’s 
completion once it is announced; this is presumably because by nature, a deal’s completion tends 
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to be determined by other factors (such as antitrust practices or other regulatory considerations) 
that are beyond the choice of either the acquirer or the target. 
 
4. Firm Location and Value Creation for Acquirers and Targets 
 After establishing the link between a firm’s urban location and its takeover exposure at 
the firm-year level analysis, we now turn to examining the effect of firm location on value 
creation for acquirers by analyzing the acquirer announcement returns. We also analyze how 
firm location affects the target and combined announcement returns. 
 We undertake these analyses at the takeover deal level. One advantage of these deal-level 
analyses is that we can identify multiple acquirer-target-pair-specific location variables, 
including the geographical distance (proximity) between the acquirer and the target, the 
acquirer’s location relative to major airport hubs (which we describe in more details below), in 
addition to the target’s urban location. These acquirer-target-pair-specific location variables 
enable us to investigate a rich set of interaction effects between firm location and proximity. 
Examining these interaction effects is important because, as discussed before, value creation in 
takeovers largely depends on the communication of soft information, which in turn depends on 
the accessibility between the two parties. While proximity is one important factor that affects 
accessibility, a firm’s location can play an additional role, given the same extent of proximity. 
Hence, the target’s location and the acquirer’s location may function interactively with proximity 
in affecting value creation. 
 
4.1. The acquirer’s announcement returns 
We first examine value creation for acquirers by calculating the acquirer’s stock market 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window [-2, +2] surrounding the acquisition 
announcement date (i.e., event day 0).15 We use the CRSP equal-weighted return as the market 
return and estimate the market model parameters over the 200 trading days ending two months 
before the takeover announcement.16 Following the existing takeover literature, such as Masulis 
                                                 
15 Our choice of the five-day event window is based on Fuller et al. (2002), who find that the announcement dates 
provided by the SDC are correct for 92.6% of the sample and are off by no more than two trading days for the rest of 
the sample.  
16 Schwert (1996) finds that, on average, the target firm stock price starts to rise about two months before the initial 
bid announcement. Therefore, ending our estimation period two months before can help to minimize potential bias 
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et al. (2007) and Cai and Sevilir (2012), we run OLS regressions estimating the following 
equation: 
Acquirer’s CARi,t = α + β’Location Variables i,t + γ’Controlsi,t-1 + ε i,t ,          (2) 
where i indexes firm and t indexes time. Controls include a vector of standard deal 
characteristics used in the M&A literature that affects acquirer returns. We cluster standard 
errors at the acquirer level. 
We report the regression results estimating equation (2) in Table 8. Columns (1) and (2) 
present the key findings of this test. First, column (1) shows that the two dimensions of firms’ 
location—the target’s urban location and the proximity between the target and the acquirer—
affect acquirer returns independently. Consistent with the results in Table 3, the positive and 
significant coefficient estimate of the Target top10MSA urban dummy suggests that the target’s 
urban location facilitates the dissemination of soft information and hence increases values 
created for the acquirer. The acquirer of an urban target enjoys an average 26.6 basis points 
higher announcement return than that acquiring a nonurban target. In addition, the distance 
between the acquirer and the target, Ln (1+AT distance), has a negative effect on acquirer returns 
(although it is statistically insignificant). This finding is in line with Uysal, Kedia, and 
Panchapagesan (2008) and suggests that a longer distance puts the acquirer in a relatively 
disadvantageous position in collecting soft information from the target, lowering the value of the 
deal to the acquirer. 
 Column (2) shows that the two dimensions of location—the target’s urban location and 
the proximity between the target and the acquirer—also affect acquirer returns interactively. This 
effect is captured by the interaction term between Target top10MSA urban and Ln (1+AT 
distance). Its positive and significant coefficient suggests that the advantage of the target’s urban 
location attenuates the negative effect of the target’s long distance from the acquirer. 
a one-standard-deviation increase (810 miles) in the distance between the target and acquirer 
decreases acquirer returns by 130 basis points (= -0.194 * Ln(810)) for a nonurban target, but by 
                                                                                                                                                             
in announcement returns resulting from investors’ anticipation or information leakage before the deal 
announcements. 
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only 9 basis points (= (-0.194+0.180) * Ln(810)) for an urban target. This represents a 93% 
reduction in the negative effect of proximity on acquire returns (= (130-9)/130). 17  
Columns (3) to (5) further explore an additional layer—the location of the acquirer—of 
this attenuation effect. We expect that the effect of the target’s urban location in column (2) will 
be more pronounced if the acquirer does not have easy transportation to the target. To test this 
intuition, following John, Knyazeva, and Knyzaeva (2011), we condition our column (2) results 
on the acquirer’s access to transportation, as measured by the physical distance between the 
acquirer and the nearest major airport hub.18 
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the analysis in column (2) in two subsamples that are 
partitioned based on whether the distance between the acquirer and the nearest major airport hub 
is above (i.e., the acquirer is far away from an airport hub) or below (i.e., the acquirer is close to 
an airport hub) the sample median, respectively. Comparing the coefficients of the interaction 
term (Target top10MSA urban * Ln (1+AT distance)) between columns (3) and (4), we see that 
the attenuation effect of the target’s urban location is more pronounced, both statistically and 
economically, when the acquirer is far away from an airport hub than in the other group. As 
shown in column (3), the target’s urban location not only attenuates but also slightly reverses (-
0.257+0.305=0.048) the negative effect of a long distance between the two parties. This effect is 
obtained after controlling for whether the acquirer is already in an urban area (i.e., Acquirer 
top10MSA urban). In contrast, column (4) shows that distance does not have much negative 
effect on acquirer returns to begin with (indicated by the insignificant coefficient of Ln(1+AT 
distance)); this is not surprisingly given that the acquirer already has easy access to 
transportation and easy access to the target. As such, even though the interaction term Target 
top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) has a positive coefficient, it is not statistically 
significant.19 
                                                 
17 In column (2), we also see that the coefficient estimate of Target top10MSA urban becomes insignificant (and 
negative). This is intuitive because as the distance between the target and the acquirer shortens (in the extreme case 
to zero), the role of the target’s urban location in facilitating the transmission of soft information no longer matters. 
18 Alternatively, as a measure of the acquirer’s access to transportation, we have also used whether the acquirer is 
located in an urban area, assuming that an urban location is more likely to have a major airport hub. This measure, 
however, is a less direct measure than the distance between the acquirer and the nearest major airport hub. For this 
reason, we use the distance measure to present our following results. Nevertheless, our findings are robust to the 
alternative measure. 
19 This cross-sectional finding itself does not deny the beneficial effect of target urban location as shown in column 
(2). It merely documents that there is heterogeneity, conditional on the location of acquirers, in the average effect in 
column (2). 
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In column (5), we pool the two subsamples and include a triple interaction term, Target 
top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) * Ln(1+AH distance), where Ln(1+AH distance) 
measures the (logarithm of) the distance between the acquirer and the nearest airport hub. The 
significant and positive coefficient estimate of the triple interaction term confirms that the 
difference in the interaction terms between columns (3) and (4) is statistically significant. As the 
acquirer moves away from a major airport hub by one standard deviation (48 miles, which is 
approximately a one-hour drive via a combination of freeways and local roads), the coefficient of 
the two-way interaction term Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) changes from being 
insignificantly different from zero (-0.192) to being significantly positive (0.45 = -0.192+0.164 * 
Ln(1+48)). Once again, this observation suggests that the attenuation effect becomes more 
pronounced when the acquirer does not have handy transportation access. 
In all our analyses, we control for a number of bidder and deal characteristics that could 
affect acquirer returns: acquirer’s size, Tobin’s q, leverage, ROA, pre-announcement stock price 
runup, and deal value. We include a stock dummy that equals one if at least part of the 
transaction is financed with stock, a dummy on industry relatedness of the acquisition, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the bidder and the target are both from high-tech industries. 
Chang (1998) and Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2003) find that higher acquirer announcement 
returns, especially in deals involving private targets, can be explained by a potential monitoring 
role performed by new target block holders. Hence, we control for target public status by 
including a Nonpublic target dummy that equals one if the target is not publicly traded, and zero 
otherwise.20 Lastly, because we include both mergers and acquisitions in our sample, we include 
a Merger dummy that equals one if the deal is a merger and equals zero otherwise. Most of the 
control variable estimates show signs consistent with previous studies. For example, the 
acquirer’s size is negatively related with the announcement returns, consistent with Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). Acquirers earn higher returns when they acquirer private 
consistent with Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002).  
                                                 
20 Ideally, we would also like to include the target’s corporate governance measures, for example, the E-index, 
poison pills, or classified boards, as additional control variables. However, typical proxies for corporate governance, 
such as board characteristics or shareholder rights, are only available for selected publicly traded firms (such as S&P 
1500 firms) for a limited period. This small sample size greatly reduces the power of our tests. Indeed, in unreported 
results, we repeat our analyses in Table 8 and include the target’s E-index in all the regressions. The number of 
observations shrinks from 11,584 (in Table 8) to only 422. Although the coefficient estimates in this small sample 
generate the same interpretation as that in Table 8, they are not statistically significant at the 10% level. We find 
similar results if we use the target’s poison pill or classified board as a proxy for its corporate governance. 
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Overall, our results on the acquirer’s announcement returns support the notion that an 
urban location of a target helps to facilitate the transmission of soft information through 
enhancing the accessibility between the two parties in a takeover transaction. However, an 
alternative explanation of this finding is that after an acquirer takes over an urban target, this 
acquirer may face increasing product demands from the target’s urban area. If this is the case, the 
advantage of an urban location is merely driven by an improved product market position, rather 
than by better transmission of soft information.  
We first note that our analysis on the acquirer’s distance to an airport hub (i.e., columns 
(3)–(5) of Table 8) may help to alleviate this concern. If an urban advantage to the acquirer 
merely comes from increased product market demands, then there should be no differential 
effects of this advantage on the acquirer’s announcement returns that are dependent on the 
acquirer’s location. In other words, customers’ product demands should stay the same regardless 
of whether the supplier is close to or far away from an airport hub.  
To further address this concern, we repeat our analyses in Table 8 in a subsample of 
unrelated takeover transactions. The intuition is that if an acquirer and the target are not in the 
same product market space, then product demands coming through the target should be unlikely 
to affect the acquirer’s announcement returns. Hence, the results we observe in this subsample 
should be less likely to be driven by the increasing product demands. Following the existing 
literature (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Wang and Xie, 2009), we define unrelated 
takeover transactions as the ones in which the acquirer and the target are from different 
industries as categorized by the two-digit SIC codes. Table 9 presents the results. In this 
subsample analysis, all of our previous findings hold: an urban target attenuates the negative 
effect of a long distance between the two parties on acquirer returns, especially when the 
acquirer does not already have handy access to transportation.  
 
4.2. The target’s announcement returns and the combined returns 
Next, we examine whether firm location has a similar effect on the target’s returns and 
the total announcement returns (both the acquirer and the target combined). In our sample, we 
obtain 2,589 transactions in which the target is a public firm with available stock information for 
us to calculate their abnormal returns. We use the target CARs over the event window [-2, +2] as 
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defined before and employ a similar regression model as in equation (2) for the following 
analyses. 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 10 examine the target’s announcement returns. Firm location 
shows a similar set of interaction effects to those discussed before. First, in column (1), where 
the acquirer is located farther away from an airport hub, a long distance between the acquirer and 
the target has a negative effect on the target’s announcement returns. This effect is consistent 
with that of Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan (2008). Second, an urban location of a target 
attenuates this negative distance effect by 91% (1.547/ (-1.691)), captured by the interaction term 
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance). Third, the first two effects are notably weaker in 
column (2), where the acquirer is located close to an airport hub (i.e., its distance to an airport 
hub is below the sample median). This observation is again consistent with the intuition that easy 
access to transportation for the acquirer limits the role of both proximity and the target’s urban 
location. Column (3) further confirms these findings in a combined sample by including a triple 
interaction term, Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) * Ln(1+AH distance). Its 
coefficient is positive and significant, as expected. 
We note that in column (1), the coefficient estimate of Target top10MSA urban is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests that when the distance between 
the acquirer and the target goes to zero (i.e., the interaction term Target top10MSA urban * 
Ln(1+AT distance) plays no role), an urban location of a target has a negative effect on its 
announcement returns. This effect might arise because as the proximity of the two parties 
converges to zero (i.e., the target and the acquirer are literally located in the same location), 
Target top10MSA urban no longer captures the target’s accessibility. Instead, it might capture 
the better information environment of an urban firm than that of a nonurban firm, presumably 
because of higher analyst coverage, more institutional investors being around, and higher stock 
liquidity (Loughran and Schultz, 2005). This better information environment makes an urban 
firm less likely to be overvalued (and overpaid) by the acquirer, giving rise to lower target 
announcement returns. However, we interpret this finding with caution and do not conclude on 
this point because we do not know whether the same pattern holds for transactions involving 
private targets whose stock prices and announcement returns are not observable to us. 
In columns (4) to (6), we report the results for combined announcement returns of the 
acquirer and the target. We find similar interpretations as those reported in columns (1) to (3). 
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That is, a target’s urban location can attenuate the negative effect of long distance on total 
takeover values, and this attenuation effects are heterogeneous depending on the acquirer’s 
access to transportation. In all specifications in Table 10, we include, but do not tabulate, the 
same set of control variables as in Table 8. The coefficient estimates of these control variables 
show expected signs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine how the geographic location of firms affect acquisition 
decisions and value creation for acquirers and targets in takeover transactions, based on a sample 
of U.S. firms from 1990 to 2009. We find that firms located in an urban area are more likely to 
receive a takeover bid and complete a takeover transaction as a target. Conditional on an 
announced takeover transaction, deals involving an urban target generate higher acquirer 
announcement returns. Moreover, the target’s urban location attenuates the negative effect of a 
long distance between the target and the acquirer on the acquirer’s returns, a fact that is 
documented in the existing literature. Interestingly, this attenuation effect is dependent on the 
acquirer’s geographic location: it is more pronounced when the acquirer does not have easy 
transportation to the target, and is weaker when the acquirer’s location already permits 
convenient access to the target.  
Our paper reveals that firm location, in addition to proximity, has a significant impact on 
takeover transactions. Our findings also suggest that the effect of proximity on acquisition 
decisions and value creation studied in the existing literature may not be monotonic. It could 
depend on the urban location of firms or access to transportation. This implication could be 
extended to areas other than the setting of mergers and acquisitions. For example, a growing 
literature finds that geographic proximity matters for capital structure, payout policy, analyst 
coverage, venture capital investment, and bank lending. A similar nonmonotonic effect of 
proximity may arise in these contexts. The findings in this paper, to our best knowledge, provide 
the first set of evidence documenting this nonmonotonic effect and call for future research along 
this line in other contexts. 
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Appendix A: The Distance Calculation between Two Locations 
For each firm, we obtain the pair of latitude and longitude coordinates (measured in degrees of decimal) 
of its headquarters from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer City-State File. Because of the earth’s near-
spherical shape (technically an oblate spheroid), calculating an accurate distance between two points 
requires the use of spherical geometry and trigonometric math functions. We therefore convert latitude or 
longitude from decimal degrees to radians by dividing the latitude and longitude values by 180/π, or 
approximately 57.296. Because the radius of the Earth is assumed to be 6,378.8 kilometers, or 3,963 
miles, we use the great circle distance formula to calculate mileage between two pairs of latitudes and 
longitudes:  
 3,963×Arccos[Sin(Lat1)×Sin(Lat2)+Cos(Lat1)×Cos(Lat2)×Cos(Long2-Long1)],   
where Lat1 and Lat2 (Long1 and Long2) represent the latitudes (longitudes) of two points, respectively.  
 
 
Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Location Measures 
Top10MSA urban  Indicator variable for the sample of all firm-years: equals one if a firm’s 
headquarters is located in one of the top ten largest U.S. metropolitan 
areas (including suburbs) and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat)
Industry urban  The proportion of firms located in the top ten largest U.S. metropolitan 
areas in each firm’s same year and same two-digit SIC industry. (Source: 
Compustat)
Founder birthplace urban Indicator variable for the sample of all firm-years with founder birthplace 
data: equals one if the birthplace of a firm’s founder is located in one of 
the top ten largest U.S. metropolitan areas and zero otherwise. (Source: 
Compustat)
Target top10MSA urban Indicator variable for the sample of announced takeover deals: equals one 
if a target’s headquarters is located in one of the top ten largest U.S. 
metropolitan areas (including suburbs) and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC)
Acquirer top10MSA urban Indicator variable for the sample of announced takeover deals: one if an 
acquirer’s headquarters is located in one of the top ten largest U.S. 
metropolitan areas (including suburbs) and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC)
Ln(1+AT distance) Variable for the sample of announced takeover deals: natural logarithm of 
the one plus geographic distance between an acquirer’s headquarters and 
a target’s headquarters. (Source: SDC)
Ln(1+AH distance) Variable for the sample of announced takeover deals: natural logarithm of 
the geographic distance between an acquirer’s headquarters and the 
nearest major airport hub in the United State. (Source: SDC and the 
Federal Aviation Administration)
 
Other variables 
Acquirer CAR The acquirer’s five-day stock market cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) over the event window [-2, +2] surrounding the takeover 
announcement date, event day 0, calculated using the CRSP equal-
weighted return as the market return and by estimating the market model 
parameters over the 200 trading day period ending two months prior to 
deal announcement. (Source: CRSP)
Acquirer market value of 
equity 
Acquirer’s market capitalization two months prior to the acquisition 
announcement. (Source: CRSP)
Acquirer size Natural logarithm of acquirer’s market capitalization two months prior to 
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the acquisition announcement. (Source: CRSP)
All cash deal Indicator variable: one if the acquisition is purely finance with cash, zero 
otherwise. (Source: SDC)
All stock deal Indicator variable: one if the acquisition is purely finance with stock, zero 
otherwise. (Source: SDC)
Bad z-score Indicator variable: one if the z-score is below 1.81, and zero otherwise. 
Following the Altman (1968) model, z = 12(working capital/total assets) 
+ 1.4(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3(EBIT/total assets) + 0.6(market 
value of equity/book value of total liabilities) + 1.0(sales/total assets). 
(Source: Compustat)
Blockholder  Indicator variable: one if there is at least one institutional shareholder 
who owns more than 5% of the total shares outstanding and zero 
otherwise. (Source: Thomson Financial 13f)
Cash  Cash and short-term investments (item 1), scaled by book value of total 
assets (item 6). (Source: Compustat)
Classified board Indicator variable: one if the firm has classified board, and zero 
otherwise. (Source: RiskMetrics)
Combined CAR The combined acquirer’s and target’s five-day stock market cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window [-2, +2] surrounding the 
takeover announcement date, event day 0, calculated using the CRSP 
equal-weighted return as the market return and by estimating the market 
model parameters over the 200 trading day period ending two months 
prior to deal announcement. (Source: CRSP)
Diversifying acquisition Indicator variable: one if the acquirer and the target are not within the 
same two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC)
E-index Entrenchment index based on six antitakeover provisions, taken from 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). (Source: RiskMetrics) 
G-index Governance index based on 24 antitakeover provisions, taken from 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). (Source: RiskMetrics) 
High-tech combination Indicator variable: one if the bidder and the target are both in the high 
tech industries, and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC) 
Industry M&A intensity Indicator variable: one if there are takeovers with the same two-digit SIC 
industry in the year prior to the event, and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC)
Leverage  Book value of debts over book value of total assets: (item 34 + item 
9)/item 6. (Source: Compustat)
Ln(1+distance b/w potential 
acquirers and targets) 
For firm-year observations that have received takeover bids, we calculate 
the natural logarithm of the distance between the focal target firm and the 
acquirer. For the rest of firm-year observations with no acquisition 
activities, we calculate the average distance between potential local 
acquirers and the firm i. A potential acquire is a firm in the same 
metropolitan area with total assets larger than firm i. This measure is 
divided by 1,000 to ensure that the coefficient of this variable in 
regressions has a readable scale. (Source: Compustat) 
Ln(1+No. of analysts) Natural logarithm of the number of following analysts. (Source: I/B/E/S)
Ln(1+No. of local potential 
acquirers) 
Natural logarithm of the number of firms in the same metropolitan area 
have larger total assets than firm i. (Source: Compustat) 
Ln(1+No. of local potential 
targets) 
Natural logarithm of the number of firms in the same two-digit SIC 
industry and in the same metropolitan area with total assets within a 
[50%, 150%] bandwidth of the firm i. (Scoure: Compustat) 
Ln(Deal value) Natural logarithm of the acquisition deal value in millions. (Source: SDC)
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Market equity Market value of equity: item 25*item 199. (Source: Compustat)
Merger  Indicator variable: one if the transaction is a merger of equals and zero if 
it is an acquisition (Source: SDC)
Nonpublic target Indicator variable: one if the takeover transaction involves a target whose 
equity is not publicly traded. (Source: SDC)
PP&E Property, plant, and equipment (item 7), scaled by book value of total 
assets (item 6). (Source: Compustat)
Poison pill Indicator variable: one if the firm has poison pill in place, and zero 
otherwise. (Source: RiskMetrics)
Poison pill + cboard Indicator variable: one if the firm has both poison pill and classified 
board in place, and zero otherwise. (Source: RiskMetrics) 
ROA Operating income before depreciation (item 13), scaled by total assets 
(item 6). (Source: Compustat)
Sales growth ∆sales/sales: ∆item 12/item 12. (Source: Compustat) 
Stock price runup Buy-and-hold abnormal return during the 200 trading days ending two 
months before the announcement date. (Source: CRSP) 
Target CAR The target’s five-day stock market cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
over the event window [-2, +2] surrounding the takeover announcement 
date, event day 0, calculated using the CRSP equal-weighted return as the 
market return and by estimating the market model parameters over the 
200 trading day period ending two months prior to deal announcement. 
(Source: CRSP)
Tender offer  Indicator variable: one for tender offers, and zero otherwise. (Source: 
SDC) 
Tobin’s q Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item 6 – item 60 + item 
25*item 199)/item 6. (Source: Compustat)
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Figure 1: Attempted Takeovers of Public Firms between 1990 and 2009 
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Figure 2: Completed Takeovers of Public Firms between 1990 and 2009 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Universal Firm-Year Sample  
This table reports descriptive statistics for firm characteristics in the sample of U.S. firm-year observations on Compustat universe between 1990 
and 2009. Variable definitions are discussed in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Full Sample Top10MSA Urban Nontop10MSA Urban
  N Mean  N Mean (1)  N Mean (2)  Diff. (1) - (2)
Sample distribution statistics 
Indicator for firm-years in attempted takeovers 18,606 0.051 9,943 0.058 8,663 0.043 0.015 ***
Indicator for firm-years in completed takeovers 18,606 0.044 9,943 0.051 8,663 0.036 0.015 ***
Firm characteristics 
Total assets (mil.) 18,606 3,449 9,943 3,996 8,663 2,822 1,175 ***
Tobin’s q 18,606 1.946 9,943 2.036 8,663 1.842 0.194 ***
PP&E 18,606 0.302 9,943 0.274 8,663 0.334 -0.060 ***
Cash 18,606 0.140 9,943 0.169 8,663 0.106 0.063 ***
Market value of equity (mil.) 18,606 4,699 9,943 5,590 8,663 3,676 1,914 ***
Leverage 18,606 0.232 9,943 0.216 8,663 0.249 -0.033 ***
ROA 18,606 0.134 9,943 0.126 8,663 0.142 -0.016 ***
Sales growth 18,606 0.096 9,943 0.106 8,663 0.084 0.022 ***
Bad z-score 18,606 0.099 9,943 0.109 8,663 0.087 0.022 ***
No. of analysts  18,606 9.660 9,943 10.476 8,663 8.722 1.754 ***
Blockholder 18,606 0.751 9,943 0.750 8,663 0.751 -0.001
No. of local potential acquirers 18,606 62 9,943 99 8,663 20.361 78 ***
No. of local potential targets 18,606 3 9,943 4 8,663 0.777 3 ***
Distance b/w local potential acquirers and a target 18,606 31 9,943 12 8,663 52.849 -41 ***
Poison pill + classified board 18,606 0.373 9,943 0.346 8,663 0.405 -0.059 ***
Poison pill  18,606 0.543 9,943 0.537 8,663 0.550 -0.013 *
Classified board 18,606 0.576 9,943 0.535 8,663 0.622 -0.088 ***
E-index 18,606 2.127 9,943 2.050 8,663 2.215 -0.165 ***
G-index 18,606 9.014  9,943 8.783  8,663 9.279  -0.496 ***
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Announced Takeover Deals  
This table reports descriptive statistics for deal characteristics in the sample of U.S. announced takeover deals between 1990 and 2009. We obtain 
takeover deal information from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. Variable definitions are discussed in Appendix B. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Full Sample Top10MSA Urban Nontop10MSA Urban
  N Mean  N Mean (1)  N Mean (2)  Diff. (1) - (2)
Target top10MSA urban  11,584 0.504
Acquirer top10MSA urban  11,584 0.524 5,835 0.660 5,749 0.385 0.276 ***
Acquirer-to-target distance 11,584 806 5,835 859 5,749 752 107 ***
Acquirer-to-hub distance 11,584 30 5,835 22 5,749 37 -15 ***
Acquirer market value of equity ($mil) 11,584 6,098 5,835 7,873 5,749 4,297 3,576 ***
Acquirer Tobin’s q 11,584 2.256 5,835 2.497 5,749 2.011 0.486 ***
Acquirer leverage 11,584 0.192 5,835 0.182 5,749 0.202 -0.021 ***
Acquirer ROA 11,584 0.097 5,835 0.099 5,749 0.095 0.003
Acquirer stock price runup 11,584 0.090 5,835 0.097 5,749 0.082 0.016 *
Deal value ($mil) 11,584 419 5,835 571 5,749 264 306 ***
Nonpublic target 11,584 0.700 5,835 0.693 5,749 0.707 -0.013
Indicator of all cash deal 11,584 0.273 5,835 0.294 5,749 0.251 0.043 ***
Indicator of all stock deal 11,584 0.262 5,835 0.248 5,749 0.275 -0.027 ***
Diversifying acquisition 11,584 0.382 5,835 0.401 5,749 0.363 0.038 ***
High-tech combination 11,584 0.244 5,835 0.302 5,749 0.184 0.117 ***
Tender offer 11,584 0.042 5,835 0.050 5,749 0.033 0.017 ***
Merger  11,584 0.007  5,835 0.008  5,749 0.005  0.003 *
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Table 3: Regressions for Firm’s Takeover Likelihood 
This table presents the probit regressions for a firm’s takeover likelihood in the full sample of all firm-
years. Marginal effects of estimated coefficients are reported. The dependent variable in columns 
“Attempted Takeover” is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is the target of an attempted 
takeover in a given year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns “Completed Takeover” is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is the target of a completed takeover in a given year and 
zero otherwise. All regressions include year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Definitions of 
independent variables are discussed in Appendix B. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Attempted Takeover Completed Takeover
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top10MSA urban 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.018***
(2.726) (3.064) (2.814) (2.898)
Tobin’s q -0.005*** -0.004***
(-3.077) (-2.709)
PP&E -0.009 -0.007
(-0.869) (-0.773)
Ln(cash) 0.002* 0.002**
(1.840) (2.188)
Ln(market equity) -0.012*** -0.010***
(-6.604) (-6.375)
Industry M&A intensity 0.007 0.004
(0.981) (0.764)
Leverage 0.009 0.005
(1.269) (0.774)
ROA -0.001 0.003
(-0.154) (0.289)
Sales growth -0.007 -0.007*
(-1.569) (-1.846)
Bad z-score 0.008 0.006
(1.454) (1.196)
Ln(1+No. of analysts) 0.007*** 0.008***
(2.877) (3.733)
Blockholder 0.021*** 0.020***
(6.076) (6.331)
Ln(1+No. of local potential acquirers) 0.000 0.000
(0.049) (0.235)
Ln(1+No. of local potential targets) -0.005** -0.003
(-2.174) (-1.479)
Ln(1+distance b/w potential  -0.000 -0.000
acquirers and targets) (-0.112) (-0.007)
Poison pill + cboard -0.002 -0.001
(-0.638) (-0.537)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 18,606 18,606 18,606 18,606
Pseudo R-squared 0.054 0.084 0.061 0.090
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable Regressions for Firm’s Takeover Likelihood  
This table presents the instrumental variable regressions. Marginal effects of estimated coefficients are 
reported. Panel A presents the regression results with Industry urban as an instrument, and panel B 
presents the regression results with Founder birthplace urban as an instrument. In the first stage, the 
dependent variable is the Top10MSA urban dummy, and the independent variables include the instrument, 
as well as the same control variables as in the second-stage regressions. In the second stage, the 
dependent variable in the column “Attempted Takeover” (“Completed Takeover”) is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm is the target of an attempted (completed) takeover in a year and zero otherwise. 
The independent variables include the instrumented Top10MSA urban dummy, predicted using the first-
stage regression estimates, as well as the same set of firm characteristics control variables as in Table 3. 
All regressions include year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Definitions of all other variables are 
discussed in Appendix B. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at firm level, are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Industry urban as an instrument 
  First-stage  Second-stage 
Attempted 
Takeover 
Completed 
Takeover
  (1)  (2) (3)
Industry urban 0.174***
(3.652)
Top10MSA urban (instrumented) 0.051*** 0.047***
(3.928) (4.229)
Tobin’s q -0.232*** -0.003** -0.002*
(-20.806) (-2.145) (-1.671)
PP&E -0.004 -0.010 -0.008
(-0.036) (-0.903) (-0.825)
Ln(cash) 0.073*** 0.001 0.002
(6.330) (1.143) (1.453)
Ln(market equity) 0.623*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(41.365) (-7.231) (-7.302)
Industry M&A intensity -0.130** 0.008 0.005
(-2.249) (1.127) (0.892)
Leverage 0.613*** 0.006 0.002
(8.248) (0.807) (0.283)
ROA -0.809*** 0.005 0.008
(-8.659) (0.547) (0.888)
Sales growth -0.030 -0.007* -0.008*
(-1.196) (-1.659) (-1.902)
Bad z-score 0.477*** 0.004 0.002
(8.763) (0.728) (0.454)
Ln(1+No. of analysts) 0.054** 0.007*** 0.008***
(2.399) (2.712) (3.561)
Blockholder -0.006 0.021*** 0.020***
(-0.183) (6.124) (6.406)
Ln(1+No. of local potential acquirers) 1.059*** -0.007** -0.006**
(62.942) (-2.196) (-2.314)
Ln(1+No. of local potential targets) 0.267*** -0.007*** -0.005**
(11.984) (-2.909) (-2.254)
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Ln(1+distance between potential  -0.380*** 0.003 0.003*
acquirers and targets) (-28.848) (1.566) (1.794)
Poison pill + cboard -0.190*** -0.001 -0.000
(-6.732) (-0.193) (-0.067)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 18,606 18,606 18,606
Pseudo R-squared 0.552 0.085 0.091
F-statistics 13.337  – –
 
Panel B: Founder birthplace urban as an instrument 
  First-stage  Second-stage
Attempted 
Takeover 
Completed 
Takeover
  (1)  (2) (3)
Founder birthplace urban 0.884***
(15.612)
Top10MSA urban (instrumented) 0.052*** 0.051***
(3.826) (4.132)
Tobin’s q -0.255*** -0.005** -0.003
(-12.163) (-2.025) (-1.642)
PP&E -0.092 -0.030* -0.040***
(-0.464) (-1.936) (-2.971)
Ln(cash) 0.007 0.001 0.001
(0.300) (0.672) (0.446)
Ln(market equity) 1.033*** -0.015*** -0.013***
(30.396) (-4.813) (-4.712)
Industry M&A intensity -0.124 0.005 0.008
(-1.164) (0.519) (1.094)
Leverage 0.727*** 0.003 -0.003
(4.855) (0.301) (-0.284)
ROA -3.009*** 0.011 0.018
(-8.848) (0.512) (0.934)
Sales growth -0.003 -0.008 -0.011*
(-0.063) (-1.287) (-1.951)
Bad z-score 0.717*** -0.002 -0.001
(6.640) (-0.311) (-0.217)
Ln(1+No. of analysts) 0.025 0.006* 0.006**
(0.545) (1.841) (2.135)
Blockholder -0.009 0.014*** 0.012***
(-0.149) (2.797) (2.727)
Ln(1+No. of local potential acquirers) 1.476*** -0.003 -0.003
(38.601) (-0.668) (-0.794)
Ln(1+No. of local potential targets) 0.514*** -0.003 -0.001
(11.379) (-0.852) (-0.351)
Ln(1+distance between potential  -293.719*** 5.455*** 5.065***
acquirers and targets) (-11.407) (2.724) (2.863)
Poison pill + cboard -0.189*** 0.003 0.003
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(-3.379) (0.651) (0.837)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 6,986 6,986 6,986
Pseudo R-squared 0.671 0.117 0.129
F-statistics 243.735  – –
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Table 5: Propensity Score Matching  
This table presents the propensity score matching analyses. Panel A reports the pairwise comparisons of 
the variables on which the matching is performed both pre-matching and post-matching. Panel B reports 
the standardized percentage bias between two samples before and after the match, as well as joint 
significance test of firm characteristics. Panel C presents the difference in takeover exposures between the 
treatment group and the control group. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A: Pre- and post-matching differences 
 Pre-matching Post-matching
Variable Treated Control Diff. t-stat  Treated Control Diff. t-stat
Tobin’s q 2.037 1.836 0.201 10.05 *** 2.037 2.068 -0.030 -1.37
PP&E 0.274 0.333 -0.059 -19.07 *** 0.274 0.271 0.002 0.73
Ln(cash) -2.560 -3.085 0.525 24.04 *** -2.560 -2.554 -0.006 -0.32
Ln(market equity) 7.132 6.903 0.229 9.62 *** 7.132 7.098 0.034 1.47
Leverage 0.215 0.248 -0.033 -10.93 *** 0.215 0.219 -0.004 -1.25
ROA 0.127 0.144 -0.017 -9.96 *** 0.127 0.127 0.000 -0.18
Sales growth 0.107 0.085 0.022 3.03 *** 0.107 0.109 -0.002 -0.32
Bad z-score 0.108 0.085 0.024 5.39 *** 0.108 0.103 0.005 1.23
Ln(1+No. of analysts) 2.100 1.977 0.123 9.34 *** 2.100 2.094 0.006 0.44
Blockholder 0.751 0.751 -0.001 -0.09   0.751 0.748 0.003 0.48
Poison pill+cboard 0.346 0.405 -0.059 -8.23 *** 0.346 0.349 -0.002 -0.32
 
Panel B: Joint significance/insignificance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Mean Bias Median Bias Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2
Pre-matching 14.80 14.20 0.043 1102.33 0.000
Post-matching 1.10 0.70 0.000 13.24 0.278
 
Panel C: PSM differences 
  Treated Control Difference t-stat  
Attempted Takeover 
Unmatched 0.057 0.043 0.015 4.52 ***
Nearest neighbor = 1 0.057 0.048 0.009 1.86 *
Nearest neighbor = 3 0.057 0.049 0.008 2.05 **
Nearest neighbor = 5 0.057 0.050 0.007 1.89 *
Completed Takeover 
Unmatched 0.050 0.035 0.015 4.98 ***
Nearest neighbor = 1 0.050 0.041 0.009 2.10 **
Nearest neighbor = 3 0.050 0.042 0.008 2.24 **
Nearest neighbor = 5 0.050 0.042 0.008 2.22 **
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Table 6: Regressions for Firm’s Takeover Likelihood in a Nonmoving Subsample 
This table presents the baseline probit regressions and the IV regressions for a firm’s takeover likelihood in a subsample of firm-years in which a 
firm’s headquarters location does not change. The dependent variable in columns “Attempted Takeover” is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm is the target of an attempted takeover in a given year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns “Completed Takeover” is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the firm is the target of a completed takeover in a given year and zero otherwise. All panels include firm 
characteristics control variables as those in Table 3. All regressions include year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Definitions of 
independent variables are discussed in Appendix B. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  Baseline regression Second-stage IV Second-stage IV 
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover 
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top10MSA urban 0.022** 0.019**
(2.265) (2.177)
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Industry urban) 0.074*** 0.069***
(4.078) (4.259)
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Founder birthplace urban) 0.091*** 0.085***
(4.158) (4.781)
  
Firm controls Same as Table 3, Columns (2) and (4)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8,157 8,157 8,157 8,157 3,152 3,152
Pseudo R-squared 0.103 0.113 0.106 0.118 0.145 0.171
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Table 7: Regressions for Firm’s Takeover Likelihood: Robustness Checks 
This table presents the robustness of the impact of a firm’s takeover likelihood on takeover exposures. The dependent variable in columns 
“Attempted Takeover” is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is the target of an attempted takeover in a given year and zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable in columns “Completed Takeover” is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is the target of a completed takeover 
in a given year and zero otherwise. Panel A repeats the analyses in Table 3 in two subperiods: 1990–2001 and 2002–2009, separately. Panel B 
consists of a subsample of firm-years that exclude observations from states California, New York, and Massachusetts. All regressions include year 
and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Definitions of independent variables are discussed in the Appendix B. t-statistics, based on standard 
errors clustered at firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Subperiods  
 1990–2001 Baseline regression Second-stage IV Second-stage IV 
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover 
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top10MSA urban 0.022** 0.017**
(2.496) (2.241)
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Industry urban) 0.069*** 0.070***
(4.288) (5.162)
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Founder birthplace urban) 0.055*** 0.055***
(3.610) (3.942)
       
Firm controls Same as Table 3, Columns (2) and (4)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9,036 9,036 9,036 9,036 3,465 3,465
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.124 0.112 0.130 0.165 0.182
 
 
 2002–2010 Baseline regression Second-stage IV Second-stage IV 
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover 
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top10MSA urban 0.020** 0.018**     
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(2.159) (2.085)     
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Industry urban)   0.030* 0.021   
  (1.648) (1.275)   
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Founder birthplace urban)     0.045** 0.051**
    (2.067) (2.315)
  
Firm controls Same as Table 3, Columns (2) and (4)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9,570 9,570 9,570 9,570 3,521 3,521
Pseudo R-squared 0.083 0.080 0.083 0.079 0.126 0.131
 
 
Panel B: Excluding observations from CA, NY, and MA 
Baseline regression Second-stage IV Second-stage IV 
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover 
Completed 
Takeover
Attempted 
Takeover
Completed 
Takeover
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top10MSA urban 0.021** 0.019***     
(2.488) (2.698)     
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Industry urban)   0.058*** 0.050***   
  (4.125) (4.653)   
Top10MSA urban (instrumented with 
Founder birthplace urban)     0.056*** 0.061***
    (3.302) (3.831)
       
Firm controls Same as Table 3, Columns (2) and (4)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 13,538 13,538 13,538 13,538 4,970 4,970
Pseudo R-squared 0.093 0.102 0.095 0.104 0.130 0.142
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Table 8: Regressions for Acquirer Announcement Returns  
This table presents the OLS regressions for acquirer announcement returns. The dependent variable is the five-day acquirer cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs, in percentage) surrounding the take announcement date from two days prior to the announcement date through two days after the 
announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. Definitions of independent variables are discussed in the Appendix 
B. t-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
    
Acquirer 
far from an 
airport hub
Acquirer 
close to an 
airport hub  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) * Ln (1+AH distance)  0.164**
 (2.508)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) 0.180** 0.305** 0.033 -0.192
(2.003) (2.314) (0.249) (-1.072)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln (1+AH distance)  -0.738**
 (-2.030)
Ln(1+AT distance) * Ln (1+AH distance)  -0.084*
 (-1.764)
Ln(1+AT distance) -0.057 -0.194*** -0.257*** -0.098 0.021
 (-1.471) (-2.665) (-2.670) (-0.862) (0.140)
Ln (1+AH distance)  0.536*
 (1.890)
Target top10MSA urban 0.266* -0.857 -1.538* -0.097 0.757
(1.649) (-1.514) (-1.917) (-0.116) (0.706)
Acquirer top10MSA urban -0.076 0.031 0.331 -0.080 0.172
(-0.467) (0.151) (1.203) (-0.276) (0.857)
Acquirer size -0.676*** -0.609*** -0.618*** -0.515*** -0.564***
(-12.823) (-9.470) (-6.658) (-5.743) (-8.723)
Acquirer Tobin’s q -0.074* -0.077 -0.123 -0.044 -0.079
(-1.736) (-1.235) (-1.358) (-0.501) (-1.236)
Acquirer leverage 1.400*** 1.156** 0.821 1.404* 1.136**
(3.188) (2.245) (1.105) (1.840) (2.136)
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Acquirer ROA 0.819 -0.109 -2.381* 0.684 -0.773
(1.210) (-0.110) (-1.673) (0.478) (-0.772)
Acquirer stock price runup -0.898*** -0.912*** -0.617 -1.291*** -0.916***
(-5.265) (-2.728) (-1.234) (-3.451) (-2.754)
Ln(deal value) 0.255*** 0.262*** 0.327*** 0.199** 0.254***
(4.221) (3.665) (3.312) (2.062) (3.611)
Nonpublic target 2.902*** 2.813*** 3.243*** 2.257*** 2.773***
(14.069) (11.455) (10.111) (6.663) (11.450)
All cash deal 0.298 0.342* 0.395 0.264 0.358**
(1.558) (1.903) (1.645) (1.043) (1.999)
All stock deal 0.039 -0.036 0.284 -0.360 -0.003
(0.191) (-0.150) (0.889) (-0.996) (-0.011)
Diversifying acquisition 0.189 0.152 -0.018 -0.042 0.022
(1.163) (0.831) (-0.068) (-0.165) (0.115)
High-tech combination -0.367* -0.235 -0.577 -0.387 -0.433
(-1.873) (-0.714) (-1.375) (-0.856) (-1.409)
Tender offer 3.062*** 2.669*** 3.520*** 1.376*** 2.566***
(7.380) (3.233) (3.223) (2.630) (3.389)
Merger  2.807*** 2.903** 4.241** 1.407 2.858**
(2.968) (2.219) (2.361) (0.783) (2.194)
Constant 2.149*** 2.973*** -1.228 0.342 -2.096
(5.135) (2.726) (-0.651) (0.158) (-1.216)
 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 11,584 11,584 6,198 5,386 11,584
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.053 0.071 0.042 0.056
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Table 9: Regressions for Acquirer Announcement Returns, Subsample of Unrelated Takeovers  
This table presents the OLS regressions for acquirer announcement returns in a subsample of unrelated 
takeovers. Unrelated takeovers are the ones in which the acquirer and the target are from different 
industries, categorized by the 2-digit SIC codes. The dependent variable is the five-day acquirer 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, in percentage) surrounding the take announcement date from two 
days prior to the announcement date through two days after the announcement date. All regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects. Definitions of independent variables are discussed in the 
Appendix B. t-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Acquirer far 
from an 
airport hub
Acquirer 
close to an 
airport hub  
  (1) (2) (3)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance)  0.201*
* Ln (1+AH distance)  (1.813)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) 0.409* 0.122 -0.123
(1.734) (0.610) (-0.432)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln (1+AH distance)  -0.831
 (-1.285)
Ln(1+AT distance) * Ln (1+AH distance)  -0.042
 (-0.479)
Ln(1+AT distance) -0.368** -0.132 -0.157
 (-2.005) (-0.792) (-0.636)
Ln (1+AH distance)  0.249
 (0.466)
Target top10MSA urban -2.410 -0.924 -0.115
(-1.609) (-0.725) (-0.066)
 
Controls Same as Table 8 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 2,246 2,176 4,422
Adj. R-squared 0.084 0.034 0.057
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Table 10: Regressions for Target and Combined Announcement Returns  
This table presents the OLS regressions for target and combined announcement returns in panels A and B, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the five-day target (combined) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, in percentage) surrounding the take announcement date from two days prior to 
the announcement date through two days after the announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. Definitions of 
independent variables are discussed in Appendix B. t-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Target announcement returns  Panel B: Combined announcement returns
Acquirer far 
from an 
airport hub 
Acquirer 
close to 
airport hub   
Acquirer far 
from an 
airport hub
Acquirer 
close to an 
airport hub  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) 
* 0.579* 0.103
Ln (1+AH distance) (1.810) (0.914)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln(1+AT distance) 1.547** -0.052 -0.531 0.580** 0.146 0.175
(2.195) (-0.085) (-0.625) (2.400) (0.602) (0.551)
Target top10MSA urban * Ln (1+AH 
distance) -2.640 -0.533
(-1.422) (-0.798)
Ln(1+AT distance) * Ln (1+AH distance) -0.440* 0.005
(-1.767) (0.056)
Ln(1+AT distance) -1.691*** 0.262 0.408 -0.403** -0.175 -0.326
(-3.344) (0.538) (0.572) (-2.230) (-0.830) (-1.156)
Ln (1+AH distance) 3.023** 0.255
(2.132) (0.457)
Target top10MSA urban -8.875** -2.223 0.164 -4.192*** -1.513 -1.998
(-2.130) (-0.586) (0.032) (-2.946) (-1.005) (-1.025)
Controls Same as Table 8
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,356 1,233 2,589 1,356 1,233 2,589
Adj. R-squared 0.137 0.108 0.121  0.116 0.085 0.103
 
